U.S. Army Field Manual 30-31B: Unterschied zwischen den Versionen

Version vom 26. Oktober 2018, 15:32 Uhr

Kapitel 2 des gefälschten Field Manual 30-31B als Version aus dem Jahr 1978

Die gleiche Seite des Kapitel 2 aus anderer Quelle jüngeren Datums

Das U.S. Army Field Manual 30-31B (auch Westmoreland Field Manual oder kurz FM30-31B) ist ein vom russischen Geheimdienst KGB gefälschtes Dokument aus der Zeit des Kalten Krieges. Es soll einen geheimen Anhang zu einem US Army Field Manual darstellen (FM 30-31, Titel: Stability Operations - Intelligence), in welchem geheime Aufstandsbekämpfungsstrategien (counter insurgency) beschrieben werden. Dazu gehört angeblich auch eine Strategie der Eskalation, um staatliche Gegenmaßnahmen zu legitimieren. Es sollten Gewaltakte auf eine Weise ausgeführt werden, so dass sie linken Gruppierungen zugeschrieben werden können.

Das Dokument wurde auch als Westmoreland Field Manual bekannt, da es angeblich im Januar 1970 von William Westmoreland als Chief of Staff of the Army unterzeichnet wurde. Eine andere Kurzbezeichnung ist auch "30-31B" oder FM30-31B". Das originale Field Manual hat nur einen Anhang A, nicht zwei.

Das FM30-31B wird von Seiten der US-Regierung und von Historikern als Fälschung angesehen. In Archiven lassen sich viele der US Army Field Manuals auffinden, ein Anhang 30-31B findet sich dagegen nicht. Anlässlich einer im Jahre 1980 durchgeführten Anhörung der CIA bei einem Hearing des US-Repräsentantenhauses (House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subcommittee of Oversight) bestätigte die CIA, dass es sich um eine Fälschung des KGB handelte. 1982 wurde der Bericht veröffentlicht.^[1] Zuvor hatte ein KGB-Überläufer aus Japan über die Fälschung dem CIA berichtet. Auch der auf Geheimdienstoperationen des kalten Krieges spezialisierte Historiker Peer Henrik Hansen kam zum Schluss dass es sich um eine Fälschung handelt.^[2]^[3] Das Außenministerium der USA gab im Jahr 2006 eine umfangreiche Pressemitteilung heraus. Darin wurde das United States Army Field Manual 30-31B als sowjetische Fälschung bezeichnet. Der ehemalige Mitarbeiter des US Aussenministerium, Dennis Kux, bestätigte dies in einem Interview.^[4] Informationen zur Fälschung finden sich im Mitrokhin-Archiv im Churchill Archives Centre (Cambridge). Das Mitrokhin-Archiv basiert auf Aufzeichnungen des russischen Überläufers und KGB-Archivars Wassili Nikititsch Mitrochin, dem es gelang, eigene Aufzeichnungen aus dem KGB-Archiv nach Litauen in die englische Botschaft zu schmuggeln. Insgesamt wurden ca 20.000 Mitrokhin-Dokumente aus Russland in den Westen gebracht.

Der Schweizer Historiker und Verbreiter von Verschwörungstheorien, Daniele Ganser hält das Dokument nicht für gefälscht und beruft sich auf den ehemaligen (1962-1966) stellvertretenden CIA Direktor Ray Cline. Cline, der den Dienst Jahre vor dem Erscheinen des Dokuments verlassen und das Dokument nie gesehen hatte, äußerte sich 1992 in einem Interview mit der BBC eher vage: Well, I suspect it is an authentic document. I don't doubt it. I never saw it..^[5] In derselben, dramatisch aufgemachten Sendung der BBC (2. Programm, "50 minutes") kam der ehemalige CIA Direktor William Colby zu Wort, der das Dokument aber gar nicht kannte. Berichtet wird auch über den italienischen Faschisten und Freimaurer Licio Gelli. Gelli wurde in Italien wegen "depistaggio" (bewusster Täuschung/Ablenkung eines Ermittlungsverfahrens) und wegen Beteiligung an einem Bankenskandal zu zehn Jahren Haft verurteilt, flüchtete, wurde später in Frankreich gefasst und sass eine Haftstrafe in der Schweiz und Frankreich ab. Gelli wird auch im Zusammenhang mit dem FM 30-31B zitiert. Tatsächlich sagte er in einem Interview von einem befreundeten ehemaligen CIA-Agenten, das Dokument zur Ansicht erhalten zu haben, es bleibt dabei aber unklar, ob ihm das Dokument als ein Original oder als erkannte Fälschung präsentiert wurde. In der BBC-Sendung kam der Verschwörungstheoretiker und Betrüger Oswald LeWinter abgedunkelt und unkenntlich gemacht zu Wort, vorgestellt als "Colonel Oswald Le Winter, CIA-ITAC liaison officer, Europe." LeWinter tauchte auch in einem anderen Film desselben Regisseurs Allan Francovich auf, der in der englischsprachigen Wikipedia als Verschwörungstheoretiker bezeichnet wird. Oswald LeWinter irrte sich bei der Bezeichnung des gemeinten Dokuments (das er offenbar nicht kannte) und bezog sich auf ein angebliches "Field manual 31-32" (statt FM 30-31B), das in Archiven angeblich leicht zu finden sei. LeWinter stellte sich in der Vergangenheit mehrfach fälschlich als Geheimdienstmitarbeiter dar und wurde wegen Betrugs zu zweieinhalb Jahren Haft verurteilt. Er hatte als angeblicher Geheimagent der CIA versucht, wertlose gefälschte "CIA-Dokumente" für 4 Millionen Dollar an Mohammed Al-Fayed zu verkaufen, den Vater von Dodi Fayed, dem Freund der verstorbenen Lady Diana. Die Dokumente sollten belegen, dass der Sohn und Diana durch den englischen Geheimdienst MI6 umgebracht worden wären.^[6]

Die Field Manuals der USA werden vom US Army Publishing Directorate veröffentlicht. Fast alle aktuellen Ausgaben sind öffentlich zugänglich.^[7] Heute als historisch geltende Manuals sind kommerziell zugänglich.

Verbreitungsgeschichte

Erstveröffentlichung in der türkischen Zeitschrift Baris (1975)

Das FM 30-31B tauchte zunächst angeblich 1973 in der Türkei auf. Am 24. März 1975 wurde in der türkischen Zeitschrift Barış (Frieden) das Field Manual 30-31 erwähnt, darin wurde das Dokument als von Januar 1970 stammend bezeichnet; es gebe einen geheimen Anhang B, der später veröffentlicht werden sollte, was aber nie geschah. Kopien des Anhang B wurden später am 16. September 1976 in einem anonymen Brief an den philippinischen Präsidenten Marcos in Bangkok gefunden^[8] und in verschiedenen nordafrikanischen Ländern veröffentlicht. Im Begleitbrief an Marcos des anonymen Briefschreibers heisst es:

His Excellency
President Ferdinand E. Marcos
Malacanang Palace
Republic of the Philippines
Dear Mr. President,
In 1974 I sent to Mr. Kukrit Pramoj, who is well-known to you and whom I deeply respect, some secret American documents revealing the dangers for the countries concerned of having U.S. troops and advisers stationed on their territories. Recent developments in Thailand suggest those documents were both timely and to the point for Mr. Kukrit Pramoj.
Now I am sending these documents to you in the hope that they will also be of use to your Government. I am doing this as one of an American group opposed to excessive U.S. military involvement in matters beyond the scope of reasonable American interest.
Respectfully
[No signature]

Später erschien das U.S. Army Field Manual 30-31B in europäischen Medien, so zunächst am 23. September 1978 im spanischen linken Blatt Triunfo, auf Seite 28^[9]. Der verfassende Redakteur war Fernando Gozales. (andere Quellen geben fälschlich das Jahr 1976 an) Im Artikel von Triunfo ist die Rede von mehreren geheimen Anhängen des Manual und die Autoren geben unklare Angaben zur Herkunft. Die Quelle sei demnach "das Pentagon" und ein türkischer Journalist aus Istambul sei spurlos verschwunden, als er das FM30-31B in der Türkei veröffentlichen wollte. Danach erschien der Text bei El Pais (Spanien) und im italienischen L'Europeo von Oktober 1978. Die Redaktion des L'Europeo erhielt bereits damals durch die amerikanische Botschaft den Hinweis einer Fälschung. Der Anhang FM30-31B war auch Gegenstand mehrerer parlamentarischer Anfragen, so zu Aktivitäten der Loge P2 in Italien und zu belgischen "Stay-Behind" Strategien. In den USA wurde es im Januar 1979 von Philip Agee im "Covert Action Information Bulletin" veröffentlicht sowie im gleichen Jahr vom dänischen Journalisten Jørgen Dragsdahl (Artikel: ”Hemmelig vejledning for USA's hær bemyndiger til terrorisme”), der keine Angaben dazu machen wollte, auf welche Weise er an das Dokument gekommen war. Drangsdahl wurde mehrfach vorgeworfen KGB-Agent zu sein. Der dänische Geheimdienst, der den sowjetischen KGB-Agenten Vjateslav Katerinkin beschattete, gelang es trotz Abschüttelbemühungen am 7. März 1983 ein Treffen an einem Vorortbahnhof von Kopenhagen mit Drangsdahl zu beobachten. Die Zeitung Ekstrabladet und der Historiker Bent Jensen (Artikel in Jyllands-Posten) bezeichneten ihn als KGB-Agent und wurde von Dragsdahl verklagt. Brent Jensen (Experte in Sachen kalter Krieg) gewann den von Dragsdahl angestrengten Prozess, er hatte sich bei seinen Anschuldigungen gegen Dragsdahl (Vorwurf: KGB-Einflussagent) auf Recherchen im Archiv des dänischen Geheimdienstes PET berufen.^[10] Das angerufene Gericht urteilte in letzter Instanz dass der Geheimdienst PET Dragsdahl tatsächlich so eingeordnet hatte, wie Jensen ihn beschrieben hatte. Der übergelaufene KGB-Agent Oleg Gordijevskij hatte Dragsdahl unabhängig ebenfalls als Einflussagenten des KGB in Dänemark bezeichnet. Auch der übergelaufene KGB-Agent Vasilij Mitrokhin hatte Dragsdahl als Agenten mit den Decknamen Stot und Yershov bezeichnet.

Etwa seit 1980 ist das Dokument öffentlich als Fälschung erkannt. Interne Dokumente des CIA belegen dass der Dienst das Dokument spätestens 1976 als gefälscht erkannte.

Die Verbreitungsgeschichte erinnert an die ähnlich abgelaufende Verbreitung von fake news der Operation INFEKTION des KGB/MfS. In beiden Fällen wurden wenig bekannte Zeitschriften in nicht-westlichen Staaten genutzt.

Field Manual 30-31B als Beleg für Stay Behind Strategien

Das gefälschte FM30-31B wird ungeachtet seiner Herkunft als Quelle für Forschungen herangezogen. Der Schweizer Historiker und Verschwörungstheoretiker Daniele Ganser beruft sich beispielsweise auf dieses Dokument für seine Forschung zu Stay-Behind Strukturen wie "Gladio" und bezeichnete es als das "vielleicht wichtigste Pentagon-Dokument in Bezug auf Stay-behind-Armeen". Ganser aber bezieht sich demnach auf die Fälschung, als ob es sich um ein echtes Dokument handle.^[11]

Literatur und Textquellen

Peer Henrik Hansen (2005). "A Review of: 'Falling Flat on the Stay-Behinds'". International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence. 19 (1): 182–186. doi:10.1080/08850600500332656
Peer Henrik Hansen, "Falling Flat on the Stay-Behinds," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Januar 2006, S. 182-186
Rowland Evans, Robert Novak (20 February 1979). "'Dirty tricks' by Russians seen as spur". Lawrence Journal-World. Seite 4
Fernando Gozales, "Top Secret, Documentos secretos del Pentágono (FM 30-31 B)", Triunfo, 23.9.1978, S. 28ff
Ganser, Daniele (2004). NATO's Secret Armies: Operation Gladio and Terrorism in Western Europe (PDF). London: Franck Cass. S. 235
Ganser, Daniele (2006). "The CIA in Western Europe and the Abuse of Human Right" (PDF). Intelligence and National Security. 21 (5): 776. doi:10.1080/02684520600957712
Regine Igel, Andreotti: Politik zwischen Geheimdienst und Mafia (München: Herbig, 1997), Appendix, S. 345-358

Weblinks

Quellennachweise

↑ United States House of Representatives, 97th Congress, 2nd session (Hrsg.): Hearings Before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Soviet Active Measures. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982, S. 37 (13.–14. Juli).
↑ Peer Henrik Hansen, "Review of NATO’s Secret Armies," Journal of Intelligence History, Sommer 2005
↑ Peer Henrik Hansen, "Falling Flat on the Stay-Behinds," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Januar 2006, S. 182-186.
↑ Soviet Active Measures, Film, US Information Agency 1984, ARC 54826, L.I. 306.9798, Minute 13:20.
Video: [1]
↑ Allan Francovich, "Gladio part III" 50 minutes, BBC-2, 24. Juni 1992
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GGHXjO8wHsA
↑ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oswald_LeWinter
↑ http://armypubs.army.mil/ProductMaps/PubForm/FM.aspx
↑ http://cryptome.info/inscom-foia02.htm
↑ Fernando Gozales, "Top Secret, Documentos secretos del Pentágono (FM 30-31 B)", Triunfo, 23.9.1978, S. 28ff.
http://www.triunfodigital.com/mostradorn.php?a%F1o=XXXII&num=817&imagen=28&fecha=1978-09-23
↑ https://dispatchint.com/921/danish-journalist-jorgen-dragsdahl-was-a-kgb-agent
↑ Stellungnahme des US-Aussenministeriums von Januar 2006: Misinformation about "Gladio/Stay Behind" Networks Resurfaces Thirty Year-Old Soviet Forgery Cited by Researchers In December 2005, misinformation resurfaced in Greece claiming, falsely, that a secret “stay behind” network, which the Greek government had set up with CIA assistance, had committed acts of terrorism. During the Cold War, West European countries set up clandestine “stay behind” networks, which were designed to form the nucleus of resistance movements if the Soviet Union invaded and occupied Western Europe. The Greek writer making the claim – and a Swiss researcher who wrote a 2005 book on the “stay behind” networks – both give credence to a Soviet forgery from the 1970s, which has long been publicly identified as a phony document. “Gladio,” which means “sword” in Italian, was the name the Italian government chose for the “stay behind” network it established in the early days of the Cold War. Other West European governments formed similar networks. During World War II, anti-Nazi resistance movements had sprung up throughout Europe, but supplying them by airdrops and other risky measures had been difficult and uncertain. The “stay behind” networks sought to avoid such problems by stockpiling weapons in secret caches ahead of time, and recruiting volunteers who would form the core of resistance movements, if needed. The program remained one of the Cold War’s best-kept secrets until it was revealed in late 1990, first in Italy and then in other West European countries. Soon after the “stay behind” networks were revealed, some media accounts accused them of misdeeds, including domestic acts of terrorism. In April 1992, some 18 months after Gladio’s disclosure, journalist Jonathan Kwitny wrote in The Nation that, “evidence so far hasn’t supported initial allegations that the secret armies used their hidden C.I.A.-supplied caches of weapons and explosives to carry out political violence that killed civilians.” Nevertheless, such claims resurfaced on December 18, 2005, in To Proto Thema, Greece’s best-selling investigative/sensationalist Sunday newspaper, which ran a full two-page story by Kleanthis Grivas, headlined, “Terrorism in Post-War Europe.” Grivas accused Greece’s “stay behind” network of several assassinations and bombings. Some of the claims are clearly absurd. Grivas accused Greece’s “stay behind” network, known as “Sheepskin” or “Red Sheepskin,” which he says was “organized by Greek special forces and the CIA,” of assassinating CIA station chief Richard Welch in Athens in 1975. Thus, Grivas bizarrely accuses the CIA of playing a role in the assassination of one of its own senior officials. Grivas also accused “Sheepskin” of the assassination in Athens of British military attaché Stephen Saunders in 2000, despite the fact that the Greek government stated it dismantled the “stay behind” network in 1988. In reality, the Greek terrorist organization “17 November” was responsible for both assassinations. Thirty Year-Old Soviet Forgery Cited by Researchers Grivas and other prominent “stay behind” researchers appear to have been influenced by a bogus text that first surfaced in 1976, a Soviet forgery purporting to be Supplement B to the U.S. Army’s Field Manual 30-31. The U.S. Army did have a Field Manual (FM) 30-31 in the 1970s, and a “Supplement A” to it existed, but not a “Supplement B.” The purported “Supplement B” was a forgery apparently concocted by the Soviet disinformation service. Field Manual 30-31B, also known as the “Westmoreland Manual” because it was purportedly signed by General William Westmoreland, was exposed as a “total fabrication” in February 1980 hearings before the U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. The Committee hearings state: In February 1976, a photocopy of the bogus FM 30-31B was left on the bulletin board of the Embassy of the Philippines in Bangkok, Thailand with a cover note from an anonymous “concerned citizen.” This is a typical Soviet bloc practice. Surfacing attracted little attention. FM 30-31B reappeared in 1978 when it was reprinted in two Spanish publications, El Pais (18 September) and El Triunfo (23 September). This was the work of a Spanish communist and a Cuban intelligence officer. Since September 1978, the manual and/or articles concerning it have appeared in the world press in more than 20 countries, including the United States. [Source: Soviet Covert Action (The Forgery Offensive), Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, 96th Congress, Second Session, February 6, 19, 1980, p. 86.] The hearings added that, “in summer 1979, the Soviets prepared Portuguese-language copies of the forgery and covertly circulated them among military officers in Lisbon.” (p. 87) The forgery was written so that it appeared to offer “proof” that the United States was the secret sponsor of terrorist acts in foreign countries, stating, in a section on “Agents in Special Operations:” There may be times when HC [Host Country] governments show passivity or indecision in the face of Communist or Communist-inspired subversion, and react with inadequate vigor to intelligence estimates transmitted by U.S. agencies. Such situations are particularly likely to arise when the insurgency seeks to achieve tactical advantage by temporarily refraining from violence, thus lulling HC authorities into a state of false security. In such cases, U.S. Army intelligence must have the means of launching special operations which will convince the HC governments and public opinion of the reality of the insurgent danger and of the necessity of counteraction. To this end, U.S. Army intelligence should seek to penetrate the insurgency by means of agents on special assignment, with the task of forming special action groups among the more radical elements of the insurgency. When the kind of situation envisaged above arises, these groups, acting under U.S. Army intelligence control, should be used to launch violent or nonviolent actions according to the nature of the case. Such actions could include those described in FM 30-31 as characterizing Phase II and III of insurgency. In cases where the infiltration of such agents into the insurgent leadership has not been effectively implemented, it may help towards the achievement of the above ends to utilize ultra-leftist organizations. [Source: Soviet Covert Action (The Forgery Offensive), p. 184.] A poor quality copy of the forgery and a declassified cover note describing how it surfaced can be viewed on the Internet. Grivas and other “stay behind” researchers have treated the Soviet forgery as if it were a real document. In Grivas’ book, Terrorism: a Privileged Means of Policy Making, he reportedly treats FM 30-31B as if it were authentic. An August 4, 2002 article in the Greek communist weekly Rizospatsis, which stated that it obtained its information from Grivas’ book, saw FM 30-31B as evidence that the United States had been behind the upsurge of radical leftist terrorism in Western Europe in the mid-1970s. It stated: It is worth noting that the implementation of the Manual coincided with a surge in terrorist activity, such as the RAF [Red Army Faction] in West Germany and the Red Brigades in Italy. It is also worth noting that the activities of 17N [17 November] in Greece began in 1975. It was a critical time that had all the characteristics included in the Manual. Swiss researcher Daniele Ganser, who works at Zurich’s Center for Security Studies, has also been fooled by the forgery. Ganser treats the forgery as if it was a genuine document in his 2005 book on “stay behind” networks, Secret Armies: Operation Gladio and Terrorism in Western Europe and includes it as a key document on his Web site on the book. Ganser writes, “FM 30-31B is maybe the most important Pentagon document with regard to the stay-behind armies.” He goes on to speculate that the bogus document may provide the blueprint for terrorist acts that occurred during the Cold War in Western Europe. Former CIA Director Describes Setting Up “Stay Behind” Networks Former CIA director William Colby wrote about his role in setting up “stay behind” networks in Scandinavia in his 1978 memoir Honorable Men: One of the main fields of the OPC's [Office of Policy Coordination, the unit in the CIA responsible for paramilitary activities] work then [in 1951] was planning for the not unlikely possibility of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. And, in the event the Russians succeeded in taking over any or all of the countries of the Continent ... the OPC wanted to be in a position to activate well-armed and well-organized partisan uprisings against the occupiers. But this time, unlike ... similar OSS paramilitary teams that went in to help the French maquis and other resistance movements during World War II, the OPC didn't want to have to arm and organize those partisans after the occupation, using such dangerous and fallible operations as night flights, supply drops, and parachute infiltrations behind enemy lines. No, this time ... we intended to have that resistance capability in place before the occupation, indeed even before an invasion; we were determined to organize and supply it now, while we still had the time in which to do it right and at the minimum of risk. Thus, the OPC had undertaken a major program of building, throughout those Western European countries that seemed likely targets for Soviet attack, what in the parlance of the intelligence trade were known as “stay-behind nets,” clandestine infrastructures of leaders and equipment trained and ready to be called into action as sabotage and espionage forces when the time came. (pp. 81-82) Colby makes it clear that the NATO allies with whom he worked in Scandinavia were full partners in such plans: … the governments themselves would build their own stay-behind nets, counting on activating them from exile to carry on the struggle. These nets had to be coordinated with NATO’s plans, their radios had to be hooked to a future exile location, and the specialized equipment had to be secured from CIA and secretly cached in snowy hideouts for later use. (p. 82) Conclusion A thirty year-old Soviet forgery has been cited as one of the central pieces of “evidence” for the false notion that West European “stay-behind” networks engaged in terrorism, allegedly at U.S. instigation. This is not true, and those researching the “stay behind” networks need to be more discriminating in evaluating the trustworthiness of their source material. Created: 20 Jan 2006 Updated: 20 Jan 2006

[1] United States House of Representatives, 97th Congress, 2nd session (Hrsg.): Hearings Before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Soviet Active Measures. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982, S. 37 (13.–14. Juli).

[2] Peer Henrik Hansen, "Review of NATO’s Secret Armies," Journal of Intelligence History, Sommer 2005

[3] Peer Henrik Hansen, "Falling Flat on the Stay-Behinds," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Januar 2006, S. 182-186.

[4] Soviet Active Measures, Film, US Information Agency 1984, ARC 54826, L.I. 306.9798, Minute 13:20.
Video: [1]

[5] Allan Francovich, "Gladio part III" 50 minutes, BBC-2, 24. Juni 1992
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GGHXjO8wHsA

[6] ttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oswald_LeWinter

[7] ttp://armypubs.army.mil/ProductMaps/PubForm/FM.aspx

[8] ttp://cryptome.info/inscom-foia02.htm

[9] Fernando Gozales, "Top Secret, Documentos secretos del Pentágono (FM 30-31 B)", Triunfo, 23.9.1978, S. 28ff.
http://www.triunfodigital.com/mostradorn.php?a%F1o=XXXII&num=817&imagen=28&fecha=1978-09-23

[10] ttps://dispatchint.com/921/danish-journalist-jorgen-dragsdahl-was-a-kgb-agent

[11] Stellungnahme des US-Aussenministeriums von Januar 2006: Misinformation about "Gladio/Stay Behind" Networks Resurfaces Thirty Year-Old Soviet Forgery Cited by Researchers In December 2005, misinformation resurfaced in Greece claiming, falsely, that a secret “stay behind” network, which the Greek government had set up with CIA assistance, had committed acts of terrorism. During the Cold War, West European countries set up clandestine “stay behind” networks, which were designed to form the nucleus of resistance movements if the Soviet Union invaded and occupied Western Europe. The Greek writer making the claim – and a Swiss researcher who wrote a 2005 book on the “stay behind” networks – both give credence to a Soviet forgery from the 1970s, which has long been publicly identified as a phony document. “Gladio,” which means “sword” in Italian, was the name the Italian government chose for the “stay behind” network it established in the early days of the Cold War. Other West European governments formed similar networks. During World War II, anti-Nazi resistance movements had sprung up throughout Europe, but supplying them by airdrops and other risky measures had been difficult and uncertain. The “stay behind” networks sought to avoid such problems by stockpiling weapons in secret caches ahead of time, and recruiting volunteers who would form the core of resistance movements, if needed. The program remained one of the Cold War’s best-kept secrets until it was revealed in late 1990, first in Italy and then in other West European countries. Soon after the “stay behind” networks were revealed, some media accounts accused them of misdeeds, including domestic acts of terrorism. In April 1992, some 18 months after Gladio’s disclosure, journalist Jonathan Kwitny wrote in The Nation that, “evidence so far hasn’t supported initial allegations that the secret armies used their hidden C.I.A.-supplied caches of weapons and explosives to carry out political violence that killed civilians.” Nevertheless, such claims resurfaced on December 18, 2005, in To Proto Thema, Greece’s best-selling investigative/sensationalist Sunday newspaper, which ran a full two-page story by Kleanthis Grivas, headlined, “Terrorism in Post-War Europe.” Grivas accused Greece’s “stay behind” network of several assassinations and bombings. Some of the claims are clearly absurd. Grivas accused Greece’s “stay behind” network, known as “Sheepskin” or “Red Sheepskin,” which he says was “organized by Greek special forces and the CIA,” of assassinating CIA station chief Richard Welch in Athens in 1975. Thus, Grivas bizarrely accuses the CIA of playing a role in the assassination of one of its own senior officials. Grivas also accused “Sheepskin” of the assassination in Athens of British military attaché Stephen Saunders in 2000, despite the fact that the Greek government stated it dismantled the “stay behind” network in 1988. In reality, the Greek terrorist organization “17 November” was responsible for both assassinations. Thirty Year-Old Soviet Forgery Cited by Researchers Grivas and other prominent “stay behind” researchers appear to have been influenced by a bogus text that first surfaced in 1976, a Soviet forgery purporting to be Supplement B to the U.S. Army’s Field Manual 30-31. The U.S. Army did have a Field Manual (FM) 30-31 in the 1970s, and a “Supplement A” to it existed, but not a “Supplement B.” The purported “Supplement B” was a forgery apparently concocted by the Soviet disinformation service. Field Manual 30-31B, also known as the “Westmoreland Manual” because it was purportedly signed by General William Westmoreland, was exposed as a “total fabrication” in February 1980 hearings before the U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. The Committee hearings state: In February 1976, a photocopy of the bogus FM 30-31B was left on the bulletin board of the Embassy of the Philippines in Bangkok, Thailand with a cover note from an anonymous “concerned citizen.” This is a typical Soviet bloc practice. Surfacing attracted little attention. FM 30-31B reappeared in 1978 when it was reprinted in two Spanish publications, El Pais (18 September) and El Triunfo (23 September). This was the work of a Spanish communist and a Cuban intelligence officer. Since September 1978, the manual and/or articles concerning it have appeared in the world press in more than 20 countries, including the United States. [Source: Soviet Covert Action (The Forgery Offensive), Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, 96th Congress, Second Session, February 6, 19, 1980, p. 86.] The hearings added that, “in summer 1979, the Soviets prepared Portuguese-language copies of the forgery and covertly circulated them among military officers in Lisbon.” (p. 87) The forgery was written so that it appeared to offer “proof” that the United States was the secret sponsor of terrorist acts in foreign countries, stating, in a section on “Agents in Special Operations:” There may be times when HC [Host Country] governments show passivity or indecision in the face of Communist or Communist-inspired subversion, and react with inadequate vigor to intelligence estimates transmitted by U.S. agencies. Such situations are particularly likely to arise when the insurgency seeks to achieve tactical advantage by temporarily refraining from violence, thus lulling HC authorities into a state of false security. In such cases, U.S. Army intelligence must have the means of launching special operations which will convince the HC governments and public opinion of the reality of the insurgent danger and of the necessity of counteraction. To this end, U.S. Army intelligence should seek to penetrate the insurgency by means of agents on special assignment, with the task of forming special action groups among the more radical elements of the insurgency. When the kind of situation envisaged above arises, these groups, acting under U.S. Army intelligence control, should be used to launch violent or nonviolent actions according to the nature of the case. Such actions could include those described in FM 30-31 as characterizing Phase II and III of insurgency. In cases where the infiltration of such agents into the insurgent leadership has not been effectively implemented, it may help towards the achievement of the above ends to utilize ultra-leftist organizations. [Source: Soviet Covert Action (The Forgery Offensive), p. 184.] A poor quality copy of the forgery and a declassified cover note describing how it surfaced can be viewed on the Internet. Grivas and other “stay behind” researchers have treated the Soviet forgery as if it were a real document. In Grivas’ book, Terrorism: a Privileged Means of Policy Making, he reportedly treats FM 30-31B as if it were authentic. An August 4, 2002 article in the Greek communist weekly Rizospatsis, which stated that it obtained its information from Grivas’ book, saw FM 30-31B as evidence that the United States had been behind the upsurge of radical leftist terrorism in Western Europe in the mid-1970s. It stated: It is worth noting that the implementation of the Manual coincided with a surge in terrorist activity, such as the RAF [Red Army Faction] in West Germany and the Red Brigades in Italy. It is also worth noting that the activities of 17N [17 November] in Greece began in 1975. It was a critical time that had all the characteristics included in the Manual. Swiss researcher Daniele Ganser, who works at Zurich’s Center for Security Studies, has also been fooled by the forgery. Ganser treats the forgery as if it was a genuine document in his 2005 book on “stay behind” networks, Secret Armies: Operation Gladio and Terrorism in Western Europe and includes it as a key document on his Web site on the book. Ganser writes, “FM 30-31B is maybe the most important Pentagon document with regard to the stay-behind armies.” He goes on to speculate that the bogus document may provide the blueprint for terrorist acts that occurred during the Cold War in Western Europe. Former CIA Director Describes Setting Up “Stay Behind” Networks Former CIA director William Colby wrote about his role in setting up “stay behind” networks in Scandinavia in his 1978 memoir Honorable Men: One of the main fields of the OPC's [Office of Policy Coordination, the unit in the CIA responsible for paramilitary activities] work then [in 1951] was planning for the not unlikely possibility of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. And, in the event the Russians succeeded in taking over any or all of the countries of the Continent ... the OPC wanted to be in a position to activate well-armed and well-organized partisan uprisings against the occupiers. But this time, unlike ... similar OSS paramilitary teams that went in to help the French maquis and other resistance movements during World War II, the OPC didn't want to have to arm and organize those partisans after the occupation, using such dangerous and fallible operations as night flights, supply drops, and parachute infiltrations behind enemy lines. No, this time ... we intended to have that resistance capability in place before the occupation, indeed even before an invasion; we were determined to organize and supply it now, while we still had the time in which to do it right and at the minimum of risk. Thus, the OPC had undertaken a major program of building, throughout those Western European countries that seemed likely targets for Soviet attack, what in the parlance of the intelligence trade were known as “stay-behind nets,” clandestine infrastructures of leaders and equipment trained and ready to be called into action as sabotage and espionage forces when the time came. (pp. 81-82) Colby makes it clear that the NATO allies with whom he worked in Scandinavia were full partners in such plans: … the governments themselves would build their own stay-behind nets, counting on activating them from exile to carry on the struggle. These nets had to be coordinated with NATO’s plans, their radios had to be hooked to a future exile location, and the specialized equipment had to be secured from CIA and secretly cached in snowy hideouts for later use. (p. 82) Conclusion A thirty year-old Soviet forgery has been cited as one of the central pieces of “evidence” for the false notion that West European “stay-behind” networks engaged in terrorism, allegedly at U.S. instigation. This is not true, and those researching the “stay behind” networks need to be more discriminating in evaluating the trustworthiness of their source material. Created: 20 Jan 2006 Updated: 20 Jan 2006

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 :''His Excellency<br>President Ferdinand E. Marcos<br>Malacanang Palace<br>Republic of the Philippines<br>Dear Mr. President,<br>In 1974 I sent to Mr. Kukrit Pramoj, who is well-known to you and whom I deeply respect, some secret American documents revealing the dangers for the countries concerned of having U.S. troops and advisers stationed on their territories. Recent developments in Thailand suggest those documents were both timely and to the point for Mr. Kukrit Pramoj.<br>Now I am sending these documents to you in the hope that they will also be of use to your Government. I am doing this as one of an American group opposed to excessive U.S. military involvement in matters beyond the scope of reasonable American interest.<br>Respectfully<br>[No signature]''
-Später erschien das U.S. Army Field Manual 30-31B in europäischen Medien, so zunächst am 23. September 1978 im spanischen linken Blatt Triunfo, auf Seite 28<ref>Fernando Gozales, "Top Secret, Documentos secretos del Pentágono (FM 30-31 B)", Triunfo, 23.9.1978, S. 28ff.<br>http://www.triunfodigital.com/mostradorn.php?a%F1o=XXXII&num=817&imagen=28&fecha=1978-09-23</ref>. Der verfassende Redakteur war Fernando Gozales. (andere Quellen geben fälschlich das Jahr 1976 an) Im Artikel von Triunfo ist die Rede von mehreren geheimen Anhängen des Manual und die Autoren geben unklare Angaben zur Herkunft. Die Quelle sei demnach "das Pentagon" und ein türkischer Journalist aus Istambul sei spurlos verschwunden, als er das FM30-31B in der Türkei veröffentlichen wollte. Danach erschien der Text bei El Pais (Spanien) und im italienischen L'Europeo von Oktober 1978. Die Redaktion des L'Europeo erhielt bereits damals durch die amerikanische Botschaft den Hinweis einer Fälschung. Der Anhang FM30-31B war auch Gegenstand mehrerer parlamentarischer Anfragen, so zu Aktivitäten der Loge P2 in Italien und zu belgischen "Stay-Behind" Strategien. In den USA wurde es im Januar 1979 von Philip Agee im "Covert Action Information Bulletin" veröffentlicht sowie im gleichen Jahr vom dänischen Journalisten Jørgen Dragsdahl (Artikel: ''”Hemmelig vejledning for USA's hær bemyndiger til terrorisme”''), der keine Angaben dazu machen wollte, auf welche Weise er an das Dokument gekommen war. Drangsdahl wurde mehrfach vorgeworfen KGB-Agent zu sein. Der dänische Geheimdienst, der den sowjetischen KGB-Agenten Vjateslav Katerinkin beschattete, gelang es trotz Abschüttelbemühungen am 7. März 1983 ein Treffen an einem Vorortbahnhof von Kopenhagen mit Drangsdahl zu beobachten. Die Zeitung Ekstrabladet und der Historiker Bent Jensen (Artikel in ''Jyllands-Posten'') bezeichneten ihn als KGB-Agent und wurde von Dragsdahl verklagt. Brent Jensen (Experte in Sachen kalter Krieg) gewann den von Dragsdahl angestrengten Prozess, er hatte sich bei seinen Anschuldigungen gegen Dragsdahl (Vorwurf: KGB-Einflussagent) auf Recherchen im Archiv des dänischen Geheimdienstes PET berufen.<ref>https://dispatchint.com/921/danish-journalist-jorgen-dragsdahl-was-a-kgb-agent</ref> Das angerufene Gericht urteilte in letzter Instanz dass der Geheimdienst PET Dragsdahl tatsächlich so eingeordnet hatte, wie Jensen ihn beschrieben hatte. Der übergelaufene KGB-Agent Oleg Gordijevskij hatte Dragsdahl unabhängig ebenfalls als Einflussagenten des KGB in Dänemark bezeichnet.
+Später erschien das U.S. Army Field Manual 30-31B in europäischen Medien, so zunächst am 23. September 1978 im spanischen linken Blatt Triunfo, auf Seite 28<ref>Fernando Gozales, "Top Secret, Documentos secretos del Pentágono (FM 30-31 B)", Triunfo, 23.9.1978, S. 28ff.<br>http://www.triunfodigital.com/mostradorn.php?a%F1o=XXXII&num=817&imagen=28&fecha=1978-09-23</ref>. Der verfassende Redakteur war Fernando Gozales. (andere Quellen geben fälschlich das Jahr 1976 an) Im Artikel von Triunfo ist die Rede von mehreren geheimen Anhängen des Manual und die Autoren geben unklare Angaben zur Herkunft. Die Quelle sei demnach "das Pentagon" und ein türkischer Journalist aus Istambul sei spurlos verschwunden, als er das FM30-31B in der Türkei veröffentlichen wollte. Danach erschien der Text bei El Pais (Spanien) und im italienischen L'Europeo von Oktober 1978. Die Redaktion des L'Europeo erhielt bereits damals durch die amerikanische Botschaft den Hinweis einer Fälschung. Der Anhang FM30-31B war auch Gegenstand mehrerer parlamentarischer Anfragen, so zu Aktivitäten der Loge P2 in Italien und zu belgischen "Stay-Behind" Strategien. In den USA wurde es im Januar 1979 von Philip Agee im "Covert Action Information Bulletin" veröffentlicht sowie im gleichen Jahr vom dänischen Journalisten Jørgen Dragsdahl (Artikel: ''”Hemmelig vejledning for USA's hær bemyndiger til terrorisme”''), der keine Angaben dazu machen wollte, auf welche Weise er an das Dokument gekommen war. Drangsdahl wurde mehrfach vorgeworfen KGB-Agent zu sein. Der dänische Geheimdienst, der den sowjetischen KGB-Agenten Vjateslav Katerinkin beschattete, gelang es trotz Abschüttelbemühungen am 7. März 1983 ein Treffen an einem Vorortbahnhof von Kopenhagen mit Drangsdahl zu beobachten. Die Zeitung Ekstrabladet und der Historiker Bent Jensen (Artikel in ''Jyllands-Posten'') bezeichneten ihn als KGB-Agent und wurde von Dragsdahl verklagt. Brent Jensen (Experte in Sachen kalter Krieg) gewann den von Dragsdahl angestrengten Prozess, er hatte sich bei seinen Anschuldigungen gegen Dragsdahl (Vorwurf: KGB-Einflussagent) auf Recherchen im Archiv des dänischen Geheimdienstes PET berufen.<ref>https://dispatchint.com/921/danish-journalist-jorgen-dragsdahl-was-a-kgb-agent</ref> Das angerufene Gericht urteilte in letzter Instanz dass der Geheimdienst PET Dragsdahl tatsächlich so eingeordnet hatte, wie Jensen ihn beschrieben hatte. Der übergelaufene KGB-Agent Oleg Gordijevskij hatte Dragsdahl unabhängig ebenfalls als Einflussagenten des KGB in Dänemark bezeichnet. Auch der übergelaufene KGB-Agent Vasilij Mitrokhin hatte Dragsdahl als Agenten mit den Decknamen Stot und Yershov bezeichnet.
 Etwa seit 1980 ist das Dokument öffentlich als Fälschung erkannt. Interne Dokumente des CIA belegen dass der Dienst das Dokument spätestens 1976 als gefälscht erkannte.