Diskussion:U.S. Army Field Manual 30-31B
20 January 2006
Misinformation about "Gladio/Stay Behind" Networks Resurfaces Thirty Year-Old Soviet Forgery Cited by Researchers
In December 2005, misinformation resurfaced in Greece claiming, falsely, that a secret “stay behind” network, which the Greek government had set up with CIA assistance, had committed acts of terrorism. During the Cold War, West European countries set up clandestine “stay behind” networks, which were designed to form the nucleus of resistance movements if the Soviet Union invaded and occupied Western Europe.
The Greek writer making the claim – and a Swiss researcher who wrote a 2005 book on the “stay behind” networks – both give credence to a Soviet forgery from the 1970s, which has long been publicly identified as a phony document.
“Gladio,” which means “sword” in Italian, was the name the Italian government chose for the “stay behind” network it established in the early days of the Cold War. Other West European governments formed similar networks.
During World War II, anti-Nazi resistance movements had sprung up throughout Europe, but supplying them by airdrops and other risky measures had been difficult and uncertain. The “stay behind” networks sought to avoid such problems by stockpiling weapons in secret caches ahead of time, and recruiting volunteers who would form the core of resistance movements, if needed. The program remained one of the Cold War’s best-kept secrets until it was revealed in late 1990, first in Italy and then in other West European countries.
Soon after the “stay behind” networks were revealed, some media accounts accused them of misdeeds, including domestic acts of terrorism. In April 1992, some 18 months after Gladio’s disclosure, journalist Jonathan Kwitny wrote in The Nation that, “evidence so far hasn’t supported initial allegations that the secret armies used their hidden C.I.A.-supplied caches of weapons and explosives to carry out political violence that killed civilians.”
Nevertheless, such claims resurfaced on December 18, 2005, in To Proto Thema, Greece’s best-selling investigative/sensationalist Sunday newspaper, which ran a full two-page story by Kleanthis Grivas, headlined, “Terrorism in Post-War Europe.” Grivas accused Greece’s “stay behind” network of several assassinations and bombings.
Some of the claims are clearly absurd. Grivas accused Greece’s “stay behind” network, known as “Sheepskin” or “Red Sheepskin,” which he says was “organized by Greek special forces and the CIA,” of assassinating CIA station chief Richard Welch in Athens in 1975. Thus, Grivas bizarrely accuses the CIA of playing a role in the assassination of one of its own senior officials.
Grivas also accused “Sheepskin” of the assassination in Athens of British military attaché Stephen Saunders in 2000, despite the fact that the Greek government stated it dismantled the “stay behind” network in 1988. In reality, the Greek terrorist organization “17 November” was responsible for both assassinations.
Thirty Year-Old Soviet Forgery Cited by Researchers
Grivas and other prominent “stay behind” researchers appear to have been influenced by a bogus text that first surfaced in 1976, a Soviet forgery purporting to be Supplement B to the U.S. Army’s Field Manual 30-31.
The U.S. Army did have a Field Manual (FM) 30-31 in the 1970s, and a “Supplement A” to it existed, but not a “Supplement B.” The purported “Supplement B” was a forgery apparently concocted by the Soviet disinformation service.
Field Manual 30-31B, also known as the “Westmoreland Manual” because it was purportedly signed by General William Westmoreland, was exposed as a “total fabrication” in February 1980 hearings before the U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. The Committee hearings state:
In February 1976, a photocopy of the bogus FM 30-31B was left on the bulletin board of the Embassy of the Philippines in Bangkok, Thailand with a cover note from an anonymous “concerned citizen.” This is a typical Soviet bloc practice. Surfacing attracted little attention. FM 30-31B reappeared in 1978 when it was reprinted in two Spanish publications, El Pais (18 September) and El Triunfo (23 September). This was the work of a Spanish communist and a Cuban intelligence officer. Since September 1978, the manual and/or articles concerning it have appeared in the world press in more than 20 countries, including the United States. [Source: Soviet Covert Action (The Forgery Offensive), Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, 96th Congress, Second Session, February 6, 19, 1980, p. 86.]
The hearings added that, “in summer 1979, the Soviets prepared Portuguese-language copies of the forgery and covertly circulated them among military officers in Lisbon.” (p. 87)
The forgery was written so that it appeared to offer “proof” that the United States was the secret sponsor of terrorist acts in foreign countries, stating, in a section on “Agents in Special Operations:”
There may be times when HC [Host Country] governments show passivity or indecision in the face of Communist or Communist-inspired subversion, and react with inadequate vigor to intelligence estimates transmitted by U.S. agencies. Such situations are particularly likely to arise when the insurgency seeks to achieve tactical advantage by temporarily refraining from violence, thus lulling HC authorities into a state of false security. In such cases, U.S. Army intelligence must have the means of launching special operations which will convince the HC governments and public opinion of the reality of the insurgent danger and of the necessity of counteraction.
To this end, U.S. Army intelligence should seek to penetrate the insurgency by means of agents on special assignment, with the task of forming special action groups among the more radical elements of the insurgency. When the kind of situation envisaged above arises, these groups, acting under U.S. Army intelligence control, should be used to launch violent or nonviolent actions according to the nature of the case. Such actions could include those described in FM 30-31 as characterizing Phase II and III of insurgency.
In cases where the infiltration of such agents into the insurgent leadership has not been effectively implemented, it may help towards the achievement of the above ends to utilize ultra-leftist organizations. [Source: Soviet Covert Action (The Forgery Offensive), p. 184.]
A poor quality copy of the forgery and a declassified cover note describing how it surfaced can be viewed on the Internet.
Grivas and other “stay behind” researchers have treated the Soviet forgery as if it were a real document.
In Grivas’ book, Terrorism: a Privileged Means of Policy Making, he reportedly treats FM 30-31B as if it were authentic. An August 4, 2002 article in the Greek communist weekly Rizospatsis, which stated that it obtained its information from Grivas’ book, saw FM 30-31B as evidence that the United States had been behind the upsurge of radical leftist terrorism in Western Europe in the mid-1970s. It stated:
It is worth noting that the implementation of the Manual coincided with a surge in terrorist activity, such as the RAF [Red Army Faction] in West Germany and the Red Brigades in Italy. It is also worth noting that the activities of 17N [17 November] in Greece began in 1975. It was a critical time that had all the characteristics included in the Manual.
Swiss researcher Daniele Ganser, who works at Zurich’s Center for Security Studies, has also been fooled by the forgery. Ganser treats the forgery as if it was a genuine document in his 2005 book on “stay behind” networks, Secret Armies: Operation Gladio and Terrorism in Western Europe and includes it as a key document on his Web site on the book. Ganser writes, “FM 30-31B is maybe the most important Pentagon document with regard to the stay-behind armies.” He goes on to speculate that the bogus document may provide the blueprint for terrorist acts that occurred during the Cold War in Western Europe.
Former CIA Director Describes Setting Up “Stay Behind” Networks
Former CIA director William Colby wrote about his role in setting up “stay behind” networks in Scandinavia in his 1978 memoir Honorable Men:
One of the main fields of the OPC's [Office of Policy Coordination, the unit in the CIA responsible for paramilitary activities] work then [in 1951] was planning for the not unlikely possibility of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. And, in the event the Russians succeeded in taking over any or all of the countries of the Continent ... the OPC wanted to be in a position to activate well-armed and well-organized partisan uprisings against the occupiers. But this time, unlike ... similar OSS paramilitary teams that went in to help the French maquis and other resistance movements during World War II, the OPC didn't want to have to arm and organize those partisans after the occupation, using such dangerous and fallible operations as night flights, supply drops, and parachute infiltrations behind enemy lines. No, this time ... we intended to have that resistance capability in place before the occupation, indeed even before an invasion; we were determined to organize and supply it now, while we still had the time in which to do it right and at the minimum of risk. Thus, the OPC had undertaken a major program of building, throughout those Western European countries that seemed likely targets for Soviet attack, what in the parlance of the intelligence trade were known as “stay-behind nets,” clandestine infrastructures of leaders and equipment trained and ready to be called into action as sabotage and espionage forces when the time came. (pp. 81-82)
Colby makes it clear that the NATO allies with whom he worked in Scandinavia were full partners in such plans:
… the governments themselves would build their own stay-behind nets, counting on activating them from exile to carry on the struggle. These nets had to be coordinated with NATO’s plans, their radios had to be hooked to a future exile location, and the specialized equipment had to be secured from CIA and secretly cached in snowy hideouts for later use. (p. 82)
A thirty year-old Soviet forgery has been cited as one of the central pieces of “evidence” for the false notion that West European “stay-behind” networks engaged in terrorism, allegedly at U.S. instigation. This is not true, and those researching the “stay behind” networks need to be more discriminating in evaluating the trustworthiness of their source material.
(Distributed by the Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
Field Manual 30-31 Supplement B
Supplement B to FM 30-31
Headquarters Department of the Army Washington, D.C. 10 March 1970
INTELLIGENCE - SPECIAL FIELDS
Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION
Chapter 2. BACKGROUND
General Need for Political Flexibility Characteristic Vulnerabilities of HC Regimes
Chapter 3. U.S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE TASKS
Identification of Special Targets Recognition of HC Vulnerabilities U.S. Army Intelligence Action
Chapter 4. INTELLIGENCE GUIDANCE
General Recruitment for Intelligence Purposes Assistance from U.S. Citizens Abroad Penetration of the Insurgent Movement Agents for Special Operations U.S. Army Intelligence Advantages
GROUP-1 Excluded from Automatic Declassification
This TOP SECRET classified supplement FM 30-31B, owing to its specially sensitive nature, is not a standard issue in the FM series.
FM 30-31 provide guidance on doctrine, tactics and techniques for intelligence support of U.S. Army stability operations in the internal defensive environment. As it was intended for wide distribution, its contents were limited to matters directly concerned with counterinsurgency and with joint U.S. and host country (HC) operations to secure stability.
FM 30-31B, on the other hand, considers HC agencies themselves as targets for U.S. Army intelligence. It does not repeat the general intelligence guidance laid down in other documents, such as FM 30-31 and FM 30-31A. Its aim is limited to stressing the importance of HC agencies as a special field for intelligence operations and to indicating certain directions in which the procurement of information about the host country, in a manner more general than that required by straightforward counterinsurgency, may advance overall U.S. interests.
Operations in this special field are to be regarded as strictly clandestine, since the acknowledged involvement of the U.S. Army in HC affairs is restricted to the area of cooperation against insurgency or threats of insurgency. The fact that U.S. Army involvement goes deeper can in no circumstances be acknowledged.
The use of the term "HC agencies" in this supplement may be taken to mean, according to context:
a. The HC organization for internal defense operations.
b. The HC armed forces generally.
c. HC agencies other than the armed forces, e.g. the police and other civilian security agencies, national and local administrative bodies, propaganda organizations.
In other words, U.S. Army intelligence has a wide ranging role in assisting to determine the illegible counterinsurgency potential of the host country in all its aspects and the relation of that potential to U.S. policy. In pursuing its more specialist military objectives, it should not neglect the wider aspects of U.S. interests wherever opportunity offers to further them.
Distribution of this supplement is strictly limited to the addresses shown on the Distribution list. Its substance may be transmitted further to those selected in the discretion of the addressees as being well suited and well place to contribute to the end in view. Whenever possible, detailed instructions issued on the basis of this supplement should be passed on verbally, with strong emphasis on the particular sensitivity of this whole field of action.
As indicated in FM 30-31, most recent insurgencies have taken place in developing nations or in nations newly emerged from former colonies.
U.S. involvement in these less-developed nations threatened by insurgency is part of the world-wide involvement in the struggle against Communism. Insurgency may have other than Communist origins, in tribal, social, religious, or regional differences. But, whatever its source, the fact of insurgency offers opportunities for Communist infiltration which, in the absence of effective countermeasures, may culminate in a successful Communist take-over. Therefore, the criterion determining the nature and degree of U.S. involvement in the political stance of the HC government in relation to Communism on the one hand and to U.S. interests on the other.
2. Need for Political Flexibility
The U.s. Army, in line with other U.S. agencies, is not committed irrevocably to the support of any particular government in the host country for a variety of reasons:
a. A government enjoying U.S. support may weaken in the war against Communist or Communist-inspired insurgency through lack of will or lack of power.
b. It may compromise itself by failing to reflect the interests of important sections of the nation.
c. It may drift into extreme nationalist attitudes which are incompatible with or hostile to U.S. interests.
Such factors may create a situation in which U.S. interests illegible of governmental direction enabling the host country to obtain more constructive benefit from U.S. assistance and guidance.
While joint counterinsurgency operations are usually and preferably conducted in the names of freedom, justice, and democracy, the U.S. government allows itself a wide range of flexibility in determining the nature of a regime deserving its full support.
Few of the less-developed nations provide fertile soil for democracy in any meaningful sense. Government influence, persuasive and brutal, is brought to bear on elections at all levels; traditions of autocratic rule are so deeply rooted that there is often little popular will to be ascertained.
Nevertheless, U.S. concern for world opinion is better satisfied if regimes enjoying U.S. support observe democratic processes, or at least maintain a democratic facade. Therefore, a democratic structure is to be welcomed always subject to the eventual test that it satisfies the requirements of an anti-Communist posture. It it does not satisfy these requirements, serious attention must be given to possible modification to the structure.
3. Characteristic Vulnerabilities of HC Regimes
In the light of the above considerations affecting U.S. policy, attention must be drawn to certain vulnerabilities inherent in the nature of most regimes in the less-developed nations.
a. In consequence of their backwardness or recent origin or both, the regimes against which insurgencies are directed usually suffer from restlessness and instability. Their leading political figures are often inexperienced, mutually antagonistic, and corrupt. When leaders of exceptional stature emerge, their efforts are often frustrated by government machinery ill-adapted to modern conditions and manned by inefficient and underpaid personnel.
b. These weaknesses give rise to a wide area of possible contacts between employees of government agencies and the insurgency. Having regard to the chronic instability of the regimes, the desire for reinsurances among their supporters against possible total or partial victory for the insurgency is widespread.
c. In most cases of internal conflict in the less-developed nations, both sides claim a monopoly of nationalistic purity. But the often unstable state and relatively overt character of U.S. support gives the insurgency some psychological advantage by laying the regime open to charges of puppetry. The frequent consequence is a growth of anti-American feeling among both the public and in general and among employees of the regime including the armed forces. Whether the armed forces are subservient to the regime or dominate it, they usually reflect its nature and share its vulnerabilities.
U.S. Army interest in the HC armed forces is not confined to a narrow professionalism: is was a illegible under political import. In most new and developing nations the armed forces play an important role in political life, and the illegible of that role is changed whenever a regime is confronted by armed illegible calling for military countermeasures.
U.S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE TASKS
4. Identification of Special Targets
U.S. Army intelligence is in a position to procure information over a wide range of HC government activity. But the specialist interests of the U.S. Army require that the major part of its intelligence effort be directed towards the HC army and related HC organizations for internal defense operations.
Special intelligence targets within the HC army include the well-placed personnel of:
a. Units at national and local level with which U.S. Army intelligence is in direct working contact.
b. Units at regional and local level with which U.A. Army intelligence, usually through the medium of its working contacts, can establish productive contact outside the limits of normal military activity.
c. Local units with which U.S. Army intelligence is no in contact, directly or indirectly, and which for that reason may be particularly vulnerable to political contamination from local insurgent sources.
d. Mobile units, such as Special Force units and Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols, which operate in areas under partial or intermittent control, and which therefore may also be vulnerable to such contamination.
In addition, to the HC army and its organization for internal defense operations, attention must be paid to the organization of the police.
The police generally stand closer to the local population than the army, and for that reason may be at the same time better sources of information and greater security risks. The security risks may become acute when police are drafted into the armed forces and replaced by recruits of less experience, training and ability.
U.S. Army intelligence operations directed towards the special targets listed above have several major objectives in view:
a. To guard HC army units against infiltration and influence from elements sympathetic to the insurgency or hostile to the United States.
b. To guard against the possibility of HC army personnel reinsuring their own future by developing active or passive contact with the insurgency.
c. To reduce corruption and inefficiency within HC army units to tolerable levels.
d. To assist in the promotion of HC officers known to be loyal to the United States.
e. To extend some forms of protection to all HC agencies falling within the filed of U.s. Army intelligence operations.
The achievement of these objectives calls for the timely recognition of vulnerabilities in HC agencies and for timely counteraction by U.S. Army intelligence.
5. Recognition of Vulnerabilities
The symptoms of vulnerability among HC agencies calling for investigation, identification and action by U.S. Army intelligence include:
a. Political instability, such as lukewarm attitudes towards the regime, sympathy with the insurgency, outright collaboration with the insurgency.
b. Anti-Americanism arising from exposure to insurgent propaganda, from friction between employees of HC and U.S. organizations at the personal or working level or from the too obvious presence of American personnel in the role of senior partners.
c. Blood relationships linking employees of the HC government with the insurgency. It is common practice for a family to deliberately to split its loyalties between the regime and the insurgency, so that whichever wins ultimately the family will have a foot in the right camp. Blood ties are of special relevance to police units, members of which often serve in their own home districts and are therefore exposed to pressure from families and friends.
d. Corruption, which exposes the individual to pressure from insurgent elements and, when it becomes general, undermines popular confidence in the regime, thus encouraging the spread of insurgency.
e. Inefficiency reaching a level at which it impedes the smooth flow of illegible and thus constitutes a form of direct assistance to the illegible. It may also illegible the insurgency: it is a well-tried form of administrative sabotage, being relatively easy to practice and relatively difficult to detect and identify as such.
6. U.S. Army Intelligence Action
U.S. Army intelligence must be prepared to recommend appropriate action in the event of symptoms of vulnerability persisting long enough to become positively damaging. Such action may include measures taken against individuals, or more general measures designed to put pressure on groups, agencies, or, in the last resort, on the HC government itself.
It is desirable that U.S. Army intelligence should obtain the active cooperation of the appropriate HC authority in pursuing punitive measures against HC citizens. But there are areas where combined action is frustrated by divergent or conflicting aims and interests, and where U.S. Army intelligence must defend the U.S. position against contrary forces at work in the host country.
This area of divergence or conflict is often entered in the matter of punitive action against individuals who may be protected by a tangle of personal, political and bureaucratic complications.
Action designed to influence or pressurize HC agencies or the government itself presupposes a situation in which U.S. interests are at stake. Measures appropriate to a given situation may be official or unofficial.
Official action is not relevant to the issues discussed in this document. But unofficial action involving clandestinity falls into the sphere of responsibility shared by U.S. Army intelligence with other U.S. agencies.
The success of internal stability operations undertaken by U.S. Army intelligence in the framework of internal defense depends to a considerable extent on the degree of mutual understanding between American personnel and the personnel of agencies of the host country.
However, whatever the degree of mutual understanding between U.S. personnel and their HC opposite numbers, a more reliable basis for the solution of U.S. Army intelligence problems is the availability in HC agencies of individuals with whom U.S. Army intelligence maintains agent relationships.
Therefore, the recruitment of leading members of HC agencies in the capacity of long-term agents is an important requirement.
8. Recruitment for Intelligence Purposes
For the special purposes of U.S. Army intelligence, the most important field of recruiting activity is the officer corps of the HC army. In many less-developed nations, officers of the armed forces tend to be of propertied origin, conservative by virtue of family background and education, and therefore receptive to counterinsurgency doctrine. They are of special importance as long-term prospects because they not infrequently play a decisive role in determining the course of development in some of their respective countries.
The following categories require special attention with a view to long-term recruitment:
a. Officers from families of long-standing economic and cultural association with the United States and its allies.
b. Officers known to have received favorable impressions of U.S. military training programs, especially those who have been trained in the United States itself.
c. Officers destined for assignment to posts within the HC intelligence structure. These require special though not exclusive attention.
Standing directives to U.S. instructors at U.S. training establishments require the study of officers mentioned in sub-paragraph 2 (b) above from the point of view of political loyalty: of their immunity from Communist ideology and their devotion to the democratic ideals of the United States. The Secret Annex to the final training report on each HC officer passing through a U.S. training program contains an assessment of his prospects and possibilities as a long-term agent of U.S. Army intelligence.
Questions of recruitment are treated in greater detail in FM 30-31A where the general doctrine governing agent intelligence (HUMINT) is stated and elaborated. The directive laid down there should be applied to recruiting operations envisaging HC government agencies.
9. Assistance from U.S. Citizens Abroad
U.S. Army intelligence must take into account potential assistance from U.S. citizens working in the host countries, both as direct sources of information and as indicators of leads for the recruitment of HC citizens, official and otherwise, as long-term intelligence agents. Such U.S. citizens include officials working for agencies other than the U.S. Army, and U.S. businessmen, as well as representatives of the mass media, operating in the host countries.
10. Penetration of the Insurgent Movement
In FM 30-31 attention was drawn to the importance of HC agencies penetrating the insurgent movement by agent means with a view to successful counteraction. It was pointed out that there was a danger of insurgent agents penetrating HC mass organizations, government agencies, police, and military intelligence units with a view to the collection of secret intelligence. Stress was also laid on the probability that lack of information from HC agencies about insurgent activities in spheres where they are known to exist may indicate that insurgent agents have successfully penetrated HC agencies and are therefore in a position to anticipate government moves.
In this connection, U.S. Army intelligence should pursue two main lines of action:
a. It should endeavor to identify agents infiltrated into the insurgency by HC agencies responsible for internal security with a view to establishing clandestine control by U.S. Army intelligence over the work of such agents. (Operational records in such cases will illegible on the conditions prevailing in each country.)
b. It should endeavor to infiltrate reliable agents into the insurgent leadership, with special illegible on the insurgent intelligence system directed against HC agencies. It must be borne in mind that information from insurgent sources about the personnel of HC agencies might be of particular value in determining the proper conduct of U.S. Army intelligence and in suggesting timely measures to further U.S. interests.
11. Agents on Special Operations
There may be times when HC governments show passivity or indecision in face of Communist or Communist-inspired subversion, and react with inadequate vigor to intelligence estimates transmitted by U.S. agencies. Such situations are particularly likely to arise when the insurgency seeks to achieve tactical advantage by temporarily refraining from violence, thus lulling HC authorities into a state of false security. In such cases, U.S. Army intelligence must have the means of launching special operations which will convince HC governments and public opinion of the reality of the insurgent danger and of the necessity of counteraction.
To this end, U.S. Army intelligence should seek to penetrate the insurgency by means of agents on special assignment, with the task of forming special action groups among the more radical elements of the insurgency. When the kind of situation envisaged above arises, these groups, acting under U.S. Army intelligence control, should be used to launch violent or non-violent actions according to the nature of the case. Such actions could include those described in FM 30-31 as characterizing Phases II and III of insurgency.
In cases where the infiltration of such agents into insurgent leadership has not been effectively implemented, it may help towards the achievement of the above ends to utilize ultra-leftist organizations.
12. U.S. Army Intelligence Advantages
In the field of Human Intelligence (HUMINT) U.S. Army personnel enjoy the advantage of working closely at many levels with their opposite numbers in the national intelligence structure of the host country. By virtue of their generally superior training, expertise and experience, they are well qualified to get the better of any exchange arising from such cooperation, even in dealing with HC personnel who outrank them. This close cooperation enables U.S. Army intelligence to build up a comprehensive and detailed picture of the national intelligence structure.
Mention has been made in FM 30-31 of the desirability of establishing National Internal Defense Coordination Centers (NIDCC) and Area Coordinations Centers (ACC) to integrate intelligence operations, administration and logistics into a single approach to the problem of insurgency.
This recommendation was designed to improve the effectiveness of the HC counterinsurgency effort. But it may also be used to facilitate U.S. Army intelligence penetration of the HC army as a whole. U.S. personnel attached to the NIDCC and ACC are well placed to spread their attention over the whole range of HC army organization, to embrace operations, administration and logistics as well as intelligence.
The establishment of joint central archives at the NIDCC should be used to assist the procurement of intelligence about the personnel of HC agencies, and the more selective archives kept at ACC level should serve the same purpose. Where the existence of separate HC archives are not officially accessible to U.S. personnel is known or suspected, careful consideration should be given to the possibility of operations designed to gain the desired assets.
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
W.C. WESTMORELAND General, United States Army Chief of Staff
Official: KENNETH G. WICKHAM, Major General, United States Army, The Adjutant General.
Distribution: See page 13. [Not provided]